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Title of Journal: Economics of Governance

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Abbravation: Economics of Governance

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Springer-Verlag

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10.1007/s00145-007-9004-8

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1435-8131

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Constitutions as selfenforcing redistributive sch

Authors: Dragan Filipovich Jaume Sempere
Publish Date: 2006/12/09
Volume: 9, Issue: 2, Pages: 103-129
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Abstract

We present a model of a fiscal constitution ie a transfer scheme between income classes that is selfenforcing against a background in which predatory activities ‘revolutions’ are feasible In this environment a constitution selfenforces by structuring society’s interests in such a way that non compliance necessarily results in a revolution which society would rather avoid

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  5. Deterring repeat offenders with escalating penalty schedules: a Bayesian approach
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