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Title of Journal: Comput Econ

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Abbravation: Computational Economics

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Springer US

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10.1007/978-3-642-87561-8_21

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1572-9974

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Local and Global Interactions in an Evolutionary R

Authors: Joëlle Noailly Jeroen C J M van den Bergh Cees A Withagen
Publish Date: 2008/09/27
Volume: 33, Issue: 2, Pages: 155-
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Abstract

Conditions for the emergence of cooperation in a spatial commonpool resource game are studied This combines in a unique way local and global interactions A fixed number of harvesters are located on a spatial grid Harvesters choose among three strategies defection cooperation and enforcement Individual payoffs are affected by both global factors namely aggregate harvest and resource stock level and local factors such as the imposition of sanctions on neighbors by enforcers The evolution of strategies in the population is driven by social learning through imitation based on local interaction or locally available information Numerous types of equilibria exist in these settings An important new finding is that clusters of cooperators and enforcers can survive among large groups of defectors We discuss how the results contrast with the nonspatial but otherwise similar game of Sethi and Somanathan American Economic Review 864766–789 1996


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