Journal Title
Title of Journal: Philosophia
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Publisher
Springer Netherlands
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Authors: Brandon N Towl
Publish Date: 2009/05/30
Volume: 38, Issue: 1, Pages: 217-223
Abstract
There is an assumption common in the philosophy of mind literature that kinds in our sciences—or causal kinds at least—are individuated by the causal powers that objects have in virtue of the properties they instantiate While this assumption might not be problematic by itself some authors take the assumption to mean that falling under a kind and instantiating a property amount to the same thing I call this assumption the “PropertyKind Individuation Principle” A problem with this principle arises because there are cases where we can sort objects by their possession of common causal powers and yet those objects do not intuitively form a causal kind In this short note I discuss why the PropertyKind Individuation Principle is thus not a warranted metaphysical assumption
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