Making executive politics mutually productive and

Authors: T Clark Durant

Publish Date: 2010/12/03

Volume: 22, Issue: 2, Pages: 141-172

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Abstract

Winnertakeall elections for executive offices create highstakes electoral conflict that distorts policymaking and constitutionmaking behavior When the stakes are high so long as it increases the chances of victory officeseekers seek to shift perceived benefits toward and burdens away from potentially pivotal participants This can entail the strategic allocation of spoils the strategic selection of public policies that mobilize one’s base or divide the opposition the strategic shifting of benefits into the present and costs into the future and the strategic deception of the uninformed This paper proposes a “turntaking institution” an electoral system in which the whole term is only awarded to a sufficiently inclusive supermajority coalition if no coalition qualifies the plurality winner and the runnerup take alternating oneyear turns for the length of the term This institution lowers the stakes of electoral conflict by roughly an order of magnitude and fosters the formation enforcement and adaptation of mutually productive policymaking and constitutionmaking behaviors Critically these results hold up even when voters and policymakers are impatient and when only shortrun commitments are possibleI would like to thank Tyler Cowen Pete Boettke Rob Axtell Mike Munger Mario Rizzo and David Harper for their criticism of many drafts The seminar participants at the Colloquium on Market Institutions and Economic Processes at New York University provided many helpful comments Counsel from Virgil Storr Michael Weintraub Ilya Beylin and Taylor Durant has been invaluable I gratefully acknowledge support from the Earhart Foundation the Bradley Foundation and the Searle Foundation This paper is dedicated to the memory of my grandfathers Richard Durant and John C Sparks

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