Virtue Ethics without Right Action Anscombe Foot

Authors: John HackerWright

Publish Date: 2010/03/05

Volume: 44, Issue: 2, Pages: 209-224

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Abstract

Working out a criterion of morally right action is central to developing virtue ethics1Most advocates of virtue ethics believe that achieving such a criterion is crucial to vindicating virtue ethics as a normative theory Yet the centrality of this task marks a departure from the views of at least some of the philosophers credited with the revival of virtue ethics in the twentieth century especially from the views of GEM Anscombe and Philippa Foot Anscombe especially has sharp criticisms of the way philosophers handle the concept of morally right action along with related concepts like moral obligation Yet the work of contemporary virtue ethicists such as Rosalind Hursthouse Michael Slote and Christine Swanton features little discussion of Anscombe’s criticisms or the reasons that the other virtue revivalists avoided providing a criterion of moral rightness The dominant assumption appears to be that the earlier virtue revivalists neglect establishing a

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