Journal Title
Title of Journal: J Econ Interact Coord
|
Abbravation: Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination
|
Publisher
Springer-Verlag
|
|
|
|
|
|
Authors: Luigi Marengo Corrado Pasquali
Publish Date: 2011/07/30
Volume: 6, Issue: 2, Pages: 139-
Abstract
Social choice models usually assume that choice occurs among exogenously given and nondecomposable alternatives On the contrary choice is often among objects that are constructed by individuals or institutions as complex bundles made up of many interdependent components In this paper we present a model of object construction in majority voting and show that in general by appropriately changing these bundles different social outcomes may be obtained depending upon initial conditions and agenda that intransitive cycles and median voter dominance may be made to appear or disappear and that decidability may be ensured by increasing manipulability or viceversa
Keywords:
.
|
Other Papers In This Journal:
|