Journal Title
Title of Journal: Exp Econ
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Abbravation: Experimental Economics
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Authors: Ramón CoboReyes Natalia Jiménez
Publish Date: 2012/03/15
Volume: 15, Issue: 4, Pages: 547-570
Abstract
This paper studies the effect of social relations on convergence to the efficient equilibrium in 2×2 coordination games from an experimental perspective We employ a 2×2 factorial design in which we explore two different games with asymmetric payoffs and two matching protocols “friends” versus “strangers” In the first game payoffs by the worseoff player are the same in the two equilibria whereas in the second game this player will receive lower payoffs in the efficient equilibrium Surprisingly the results show that “strangers” coordinate more frequently in the efficient equilibrium than “friends” in both games Network measures such as indegree outdegree and betweenness are all positively correlated with playing the strategy which leads to the efficient outcome but clustering is not In addition ‘envy’ explains no convergence to the efficient outcomeWe are very grateful to Gary Charness for his useful comments at the earliest stages of this project We would like to thank Antoni Bosch Pablo BrañasGarza Catherine Eckel Maria Paz Espinosa Rosie Nagel Giovanni Ponti and Pedro ReyBiel for all their helpful comments and suggestions We would also like to thank Laura Crespo Teresa García Elena Martinez Juan Mora Ana Moro and Carlos Sánchez for their irreplaceable help in the econometrics Financial support from the Generalitat Valenciana GV 06/275 the Spanish Ministry SEJ200762081/ECON and the Junta de Andalucia SEJ2547 is gratefully acknowledged
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