Causal Warrant for Realism about Particle Physics

Authors: Matthias Egg

Publish Date: 2013/01/03

Volume: 43, Issue: 2, Pages: 259-280

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Abstract

While scientific realism generally assumes that successful scientific explanations yield information about reality realists also have to admit that not all information acquired in this way is equally well warranted Some versions of scientific realism do this by saying that explanatory posits with which we have established some kind of causal contact are better warranted than those that merely appear in theoretical hypotheses I first explicate this distinction by considering some general criteria that permit us to distinguish causal warrant from theoretical warrant I then apply these criteria to a specific case from particle physics claiming that scientific realism has to incorporate the distinction between causal and theoretical warrant if it is to be an adequate stance in the philosophy of particle physicsEarlier versions of this paper were presented at research seminars at the universities of Zurich and Lausanne at the 2010 Spring Meeting of the German Physical Society and at the workshop Philosophy of Physics in Germany held in Hannover in June 2010 I am grateful to the audiences of these events for valuable discussions I am also indebted to Michael Esfeld and two anonymous referees for many helpful comments

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