Intuitions Disagreement and Referential Pluralism

Authors: James Andow

Publish Date: 2013/11/06

Volume: 5, Issue: 2, Pages: 223-239

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Abstract

Mallon Machery Nichols and Stich Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 332–356 2009 argue that the use of intuitions in the philosophy of reference is problematic as recent studies show intuitions about reference vary both within and between cultures I use some ideas from the recent literature on disagreement and truth relativism to shed light on the debate concerning the appropriate reaction to these studies Mallon et al argue that variation is problematic because if one tries to use intuitions which vary to find the correct theory of reference one will end up endorsing an absurd position referential pluralism I argue that there is hope for intuitionbased philosophy of reference One can avoid endorsing referential pluralism as Mallon et al understand it Furthermore referential pluralism may not be so absurd after allThanks to Carl Baker Michael BenchCapon Greg Currie Mark Jago Phillip Percival Stefano Predelli Pendaran Roberts audiences in Leeds Manchester and Nottingham and to a number of anonymous referees for very helpful comments Acknowledgment is also due to the support of an AHRCfunded studentship

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