Social choice the strong Pareto principle and co

Authors: Susumu Cato

Publish Date: 2013/02/22

Volume: 75, Issue: 4, Pages: 563-579

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Abstract

This paper examines social choice theory with the strong Pareto principle The notion of conditional decisiveness is introduced to clarify the underlying power structure behind strongly Paretian aggregation rules satisfying binary independence We discuss the various degrees of social rationality transitivity semitransitivity the intervalorder property quasitransitivity and acyclicityI thank Tomoki Inoue and an anonymous referee of this journal for constructive suggestions This paper was financially supported by GrantinAid for Young Scientists B from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science and the Ministry of Education Culture Sports Science and TechnologyLet W be a QSDF satisfying strong Pareto and binary independence and let A subsetneq mathcalN If B subseteq mathcalN setminus A is Aconditionally decisive over some pair xy for W then it is Aconditionally decisive for WLet W be a QSDF satisfying strong Pareto and binary independence and let A subsetneq mathcalN Suppose that B subseteq mathcalN setminus A is Aconditionally decisive over xy for W We first prove the following claimBy applying the claim again it follows that if B is Aconditionally decisive over yz for W then B is Aconditionally decisive over zw for W Hence we have established that B is Aconditionally decisive over zw for any choice of distinct alternatives z and w square

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