Can’t We All Disagree More Constructively Moral F

Authors: Hanno Sauer

Publish Date: 2015/05/16

Volume: 8, Issue: 2, Pages: 153-169

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Abstract

Can’t we all disagree more constructively Recent years have seen a dramatic increase in political partisanship the 2013 shutdown of the US government as well as an ever more divided political landscape in Europe illustrate that citizens and representatives of developed nations fundamentally disagree over virtually every significant issue of public policy from immigration to health care from the regulation of financial markets to climate change from drug policies to medical procedures Koleva et al Journal of Research in Personality 46184–194 2012 The emerging field of political psychology brings the tools of moral psychology to bear on this issue It suggests that the main conflict shaping politics today can be explained in terms of people’s moral foundations Graham et al Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 9651029–1046 2009 Haidt 2012 Graham et al PLOS One 7121–13 2012 cf also Rai and Fiske Psychological Review 11857–75 2011 progressive liberals it is argued view society as consisting of separate individuals with differing values and life plans whereas conservatives rely on a thicker notion of political morality that includes traditions communities and values of purity Haidt and Graham Social Justice Research 2098–116 2007 In this paper I explore the normative implications of this theory In particular I will argue that its proponents take it to support an asymmetry of understanding if deep political disagreements reflect differences in people’s moral foundations and these disagreements cannot be rationally resolved then overcoming them makes it necessary to acknowledge the moral foundations of the other side’s political outlook But conservatives the theory suggests already do acknowledge all of the liberal moral foundations and not vice versa To overcome partisanship and the resulting political deadlock then it seems to be up to liberals to move closer towards the conservative side and not vice versa I wish to analyze what the argument for this asymmetry is and whether it holds up In the end I shall argue that the available evidence does support an asymmetry but that it is the opposite of what Moral Foundations theorists think it is There is such an asymmetry but its burden falls on the conservative sideI would like to thank audiences in Groningen Tilburg and Rotterdam for helpful feedback on this paper Special thanks go to Tom Bates Daan Evers Joshua Greene Frank Hindriks Dominik Klein Pauline Kleingeld Bert Musschenga Jan Sprenger Bruno Verbeek and two anonymous referees for Neuroethics

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