The Intentionality of Sensation and the Problem of

Authors: Ion Tănăsescu

Publish Date: 2016/07/27

Volume: 27, Issue: 3, Pages: 243-263

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Abstract

In the wellknown intentionality quote of his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint Brentano characterises the mental phenomena through the following features 1 the intentional inexistence of an object 2 the relation to a content and 3 the direction toward an object The text argues that this characterisation is not general because the direction toward an object does not apply to the mental phenomena of sensation The second part of the paper analyses the consequences that ensue from here for the Brentanian classification of mental phenomena in Brentano’s psychology one can distinguish two concepts of mental phenomena—the mental phenomenon in a broad sense and the mental phenomenon in a narrow sense the former concept allows the separation of the mental from the physical while the narrow concept allows the distinguishing of the main classes of mental phenomena The third part of the paper shows that with respect to sensation the absence of a direction toward an object is compatible with both Brentano’s early taxonomies of philosophical sciences and his early program for the establishment of a new empirical and nonspeculative philosophy For this reason I hold that intentionality is important for the foundation of both psychology and empirical philosophy

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