Journal Title
Title of Journal: Int J Game Theory
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Abbravation: International Journal of Game Theory
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Publisher
Springer-Verlag
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Authors: E Inarra C Larrea E Molis
Publish Date: 2007/05/12
Volume: 36, Issue: 3-4, Pages: 461-471
Abstract
For solvable roommate problems with strict preferences Diamantoudi et al Games Econ Behav 48 18–28 2004 show that for any unstable matching there exists a finite sequence of successive myopic blocking pairs leading to a stable matching In this paper we define Pstable matchings associated with stable partitions and by using a proposalrejection procedure generalize the previous result for the entire class of roommate problemsWe thank Svetloslav Ivantchev for his help in programming Ana Saracho for her participation in the early stages of the paper and Peter Biró Marilda Sotomayor Federico Valenciano and anonymous referees for their comments and suggestions This research has been supported by the University of the Basque Country under project 1/UPV 00031321HA7903/2000 and project GIU06/44 and by the Spanish Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia under project SEJ200605455 cofunded by FEDER and project BEC20000875 It has also benefited from the Acción Integrada HF20060021/EGIDEPicasso
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