Journal Title
Title of Journal: Int J Game Theory
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Abbravation: International Journal of Game Theory
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Publisher
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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Authors: Eun Jeong Heo
Publish Date: 2013/07/17
Volume: 43, Issue: 2, Pages: 439-454
Abstract
We study the problem of assigning objects to a set of agents We focus on probabilistic solutions that only take agents’ preferences over objects as input Importantly agents may be indifferent among several objects The “extended serial correspondence” is proposed by Katta and Sethuraman J Econ Theory 131231–250 2006 to solve this problem As a followup to Liu and Pycia Ordinal efficiency fairness and incentives in large markets Mimeo 2012 who introduce the notion of profiles with “full support” we work with two interesting classes of preference profiles profiles that i have rich support on a partition or ii are singlepeaked with rich support on a partition For each profile in these classes an assignment matrix is selected by the extended serial correspondence if and only if it is sdefficient and sd envyfree We also provide an asymptotic result
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