An Elite Theory of Political Consulting and Its Im

Authors: Sean A Cain

Publish Date: 2010/09/26

Volume: 33, Issue: 3, Pages: 375-405

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Abstract

Does the hiring of political consultants make election races more competitive If so why Most scholars of political consulting argue their expertise enhances competition I argue that consultant reputation also boosts competition Many political consultants are part of the Washington establishment which notices their association with candidates In particular congressional candidates of the out party especially challengers have an incentive to hire the most reputable consultants to signal to political elites their viability I demonstrate a positive empirical relationship between outparty candidates hiring top consultants compared to less reputable ones and how competitive their race is perceived by elites These findings and theoretical insight provide a basis for understanding the high costs of political consultants and their impact on election outcomesThe author wishes to thank Neal Beck Peter Burns Andrew Douglas Garrett Glasgow Paul Herrnson Gary Jacobson Sam Kernell Skip Lupia John McAdams Mat McCubbins Sam Popkin Michael Schudson and Ric Uslaner for helpful comments on various versions of this research He is especially thankful to two thoughtful anonymous Political Behavior reviewers

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