Personal Identity Consciousness and Joints in Na

Authors: Cody Gilmore

Publish Date: 2015/11/26

Volume: 19, Issue: 3-4, Pages: 443-466

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Abstract

Many philosophers have thought that the problem of personal identity over time is not metaphysically deep Perhaps the debate between the rival theories is somehow empty or is a ‘merely verbal dispute’ Perhaps questions about personal identity are ‘nonsubstantive’ and fit more for conceptual analysis and close attention to usage than for theorizing in the style of serious metaphysics theorizing guided by considerations of systematicity parsimony explanatory power and aiming for knowledge about the objective structure of the world I discuss a thesis about consciousness according to which there are perfectly natural phenomenal properties Although I do not argue for this thesis I believe that it is plausible whether or not physicalism is true Given the thesis there are deep substantive questions about which individuals or pluralities instantiate the relevant phenomenal properties Equally substantive questions can then be asked about the duration and other spatiotemporal characteristics of those individuals or pluralities both in actual cases and in hypothetical puzzle cases adapted from the personal identity literature I suggest that at least prima facie these questions interact with our futuredirected egoistic concern in much the same way that the personal identity question is often thought to As a slogan “you give me substantive determinate facts about consciousness I give you substantive determinate facts about personal identity”

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