A Puzzle About Reasons and Rationality

Authors: Caj Strandberg

Publish Date: 2016/08/04

Volume: 21, Issue: 1, Pages: 63-88

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Abstract

According to a guiding idea in metaethics there is a necessary link between the concept of normative reasons and the concept of practical rationality This notion brings up two issues The exact nature of this link and the nature of rationality With regard to the first issue the debate is dominated by a certain standard claim With regard to the second issue the debate is dominated by what I will refer to as ‘subjectivism’ and ‘objectivism’ about rationality where the latter is assumed to be a necessary condition for the existence of categorical reasons In this paper it is argued that subjectivism is able capture an ordinary nontechnical sense of ‘rational’ whereas objectivism is not The basic reason is that objectivism fails to account for the essential connection between rationality malfunctioning and rational criticism This means that we face a puzzle While objectivism appears to be a necessary condition for the existence of categorical reasons it fails to capture a central sense of ‘rational’ It is finally argued that this puzzle can be solved by abandoning the standard claim about the link between reasons and rationalityI am grateful for audiences in Gothenburg and Oslo for valuable comments on earlier versions of this paper Special thanks are due to Andreas Brekke Carlsson for helpful discussions about reasons rationality and blameworthiness I am also indebted to reviewers for insightful comments that have helped to improve the paper in numerous respects The research presented in this paper was supported by the Swedish Research Council Grant number 2012603 My work with the paper was carried out at the University of Oslo and the University of Gothenburg

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