Authors: Margarida Carvalho Andrea Lodi João Pedro Pedroso Ana Viana
Publish Date: 2016/04/21
Volume: 161, Issue: 1-2, Pages: 389-417
Abstract
Kidney exchange programs have been set in several countries within national regional or hospital frameworks to increase the possibility of kidney patients being transplanted For the case of hospital programs it has been claimed that hospitals would benefit if they collaborated with each other sharing their internal pools and allowing transplants involving patients of different hospitals This claim led to the study of multihospital exchange markets We propose a novel direction in this setting by modeling the exchange market as an integer programming game The analysis of the strategic behavior of the entities participating in the kidney exchange game allowed us to prove that the most rational game outcome maximizes the social welfare and that it can be computed in polynomial timeWe are indebted with Nicolás StierMoses for reading a preliminary version of the paper and providing useful feedbacks This work was partially supported by national funds through Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia FCT within projects PTDC/IIMGES/2830/ 2014 mKEP Models and optimisation algorithms for multicountry kidney exchange programs The first author acknowledges the support of Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia FCT through a PhD grant number SFRH/BD/79201/2011 POPH/FSE program The second author acknowledges the support of MIUR under the PRIN2012 grant We would like to thank the anonymous referees for their valuable comments that significantly contributed to the improvement of this work
Keywords: