Authors: James E Anderson Maurizio Zanardi
Publish Date: 2009/04/21
Volume: 141, Issue: 1-2, Pages: 129-150
Abstract
Much economic policy is deliberately shifted away from direct political processes to administrative processes—political pressure deflection Pressure deflection poses a puzzle to standard political economy models which suggest that having policies to ‘sell’ is valuable to politicians The puzzle is solved here by showing that incumbents will favor pressure deflection since it can deter viability of a challenger essentially like entry deterrence US trade policy since 1934 provides a prime example especially antidumping law and its evolutionThis article is published under an open access license Please check the Copyright Information section for details of this license and what reuse is permitted If your intended use exceeds what is permitted by the license or if you are unable to locate the licence and reuse information please contact the Rights and Permissions team
Keywords: