Journal Title
Title of Journal: Public Choice
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Abbravation: Public Choice
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Authors: Carl David Mildenberger
Publish Date: 2015/08/14
Volume: 164, Issue: 3-4, Pages: 401-421
Abstract
This paper investigates how order may emerge in anarchy using a novel empirical approach It analyzes the predatory and productive interactions of 400000 users of a virtual world Virtual worlds are computercreated environments that visually mimic physical spaces where people interact with each other and with virtual objects in manifold ways Notably the paper examines the behavior of users acting as virtual pirates The paper finds that even in a largely anonymous and anarchic virtual world private rules of order mitigate the most destructive forms of conflict This is true even though the virtual pirates are found to be conflictloving rather than conflictaverse Although the costs of conflict are dramatically reduced in virtual worlds private rules that limit violence spontaneously emerge An important part of the paper’s contribution is methodological The analysis of the problem of order in anarchy serves to exemplify the power and usefulness of the new approachI would like to thank Doug Allen Simon Lapointe Chris Mantzavinos Antoine Pietri Ian Smith Leonard Randall David Skarbek and Petros Sekeris for many helpful comments on earlier versions Special thanks go to three anonymous reviewers who substantially improved the quality of this paper by their intelligent and insightful comments and suggestions Without the support of CCP Games’ chief economist Eyjólfur Guðmundsson writing this paper would have been impossible
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