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Title of Journal: Public Choice

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Abbravation: Public Choice

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Springer US

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DOI

10.1016/0014-3057(83)90115-5

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1573-7101

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Political biases despite external expert participa

Authors: Thiess Buettner Bjoern Kauder
Publish Date: 2015/08/09
Volume: 164, Issue: 3-4, Pages: 287-307
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Abstract

This paper explores whether and how political biases arise in an institutional setting where revenue forecasting is delegated to a body that includes experts from institutions neither part of nor controlled by the government The empirical analysis focuses on the performance of German federal tax revenue forecasts in the preparation of which the advice of external experts has a long tradition as an institutional safeguard While on average revenue forecasts turn out to be unbiased the results show that the government exerts an influence In particular optimism/pessimism in the government’s GDP forecast helps to explain why the revenue forecast turns out too optimistic/pessimistic In addition governmental estimates of the revenue effects of taxlaw changes are found to contribute to forecast errorsWe thank three anonymous referees Christian Breuer Thomas Ehrmann Gebhard Flaig Natalie Obergruber Ioana Petrescu Bonnie Wilson and seminar participants at the Annual Meetings of the IIPF 2011 Ann Arbor the Public Choice Society 2015 San Antonio the European Public Choice Society 2015 Groningen and at the University of Munich for helpful comments and suggestionsIssued by the Working Party on Tax Revenue Forecasting in May or November for the current or the next year as specified The data cover the predictions for revenues in the period from 1971 to 2013 In current prices Source Press releases of the Federal Ministry of FinanceRevenue forecast error from the previous May forecast in the case of considering a May forecast or from the previous November forecast in the case of considering a November forecast For the nextyear forecasts the forecast error for the current year is not known at the time the forecast is being prepared In this case the revenue prediction then available is employed Source Federal Ministry of Finance and own calculationsDifference between the GDP growth rate predicted by the government Federal Ministry of Economics and the growth rate predicted by the Council of Economic Experts as issued in November In current prices Source Press releases of the Federal Ministry of Finance annual reports of the Council of Economic Experts and own calculationsDifference between the GDP growth rate predicted by the government Federal Ministry of Economics and the growth rate predicted by the OECD as issued in November/December In current prices Source Press releases of the Federal Ministry of Finance OECD Economic Outlook and own calculations


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  1. Transparency and political moral hazard
  2. Scheduling of panels by integer programming: Results for the 2005 and 2006 New Orleans meetings
  3. From the Open Society to The Calculus of Consent : a long journey
  4. Politics, unemployment, and the enforcement of immigration law
  5. Intra-industry trade and protectionism: the case of the buy national policy
  6. Political pressure deflection
  7. Coups d’état and defense spending: a counterfactual analysis
  8. Betty Tillman: a remembrance
  9. Full agreement and the provision of threshold public goods
  10. Editorial announcement
  11. Corruption is bad for growth (even in the United States)
  12. Representation, neighboring districts, and party loyalty in the U.S. Congress
  13. The politicization of UNESCO World Heritage decision making
  14. Public choice theory and antitrust policy
  15. The importance of modeling spatial spillovers in public choice analysis
  16. An explanation of the continuing federal government mandate of single-member congressional districts
  17. Bargaining unexplained
  18. Referendum design, quorum rules and turnout
  19. Thinking about order without thought: the lifetime contributions of Gordon Tullock
  20. Outsourcing in contests
  21. Justifying the Lindahl solution as an outcome of fair cooperation
  22. Economic integration and the relationship between profit and wage taxes
  23. Massimo Florio, Applied welfare economics : cost–benefit analysis of projects and policies
  24. Hold your nose and vote: corruption and public decisions in a representative democracy
  25. Conflict, democracy and voter choice: a public choice analysis of the Athenian ostracism
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