Demandingness WellBeing and the Bodhisattva Path

Authors: Stephen E Harris

Publish Date: 2015/06/08

Volume: 54, Issue: 2, Pages: 201-216

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Abstract

This paper reconstructs an Indian Buddhist response to the overdemandingness objection the claim that a moral theory asks too much of its adherents In the first section I explain the objection and argue that some Mahāyāna Buddhists including Śāntideva face it In the second section I survey some possible ways of responding to the objection as a way of situating the Buddhist response alongside contemporary work In the final section I draw upon writing by Vasubandhu and Śāntideva in reconstructing a Mahāyāna response to the objection An essential component of this response is the psychological transformation that the bodhisattva achieves as a result of realizing the nonexistence of the self This allows him to radically identify his wellbeing with the wellbeing of others thereby lessening the tension between self and others upon which the overdemandingness objection usually depends Emphasizing the attention Mahāyāna authors pay to lessening moral demandingness in this way increases our appreciation of the philosophical sophistication of their moral thought and highlights an important strategy for responding to the overdemandingness objection that has been underdeveloped in contemporary workWhile contemporary moral theorists like Peter Singer and Peter Unger insist that morality tells us that we should donate surplus income saved from forgoing afternoon matinees and ski vacations the bodhisattva of Indian Buddhism prays to be reborn in the Avīci hell to save the beings there1 For those unfamiliar with Indian cosmology in the Avīci hell fires from all directions slowly burn away the skin and bones of beings that dwell there for billions of years TsongKhaPa 20002 Bodhisattvas undergo this and many other torments as they voluntarily delay final liberation from suffering for countless lives in order to develop the full virtues of Buddhahood and liberate other sentient beings3 Although moral theories are expected to require some level of selfsacrifice if a theory is extremely demanding then it opens itself to the charge that it asks too much of its followers Any Buddhist thinker who claims that we are obligated to become bodhisattvas will face this overdemandingness objectionIn this essay I consider the resources that Buddhist authors possess to respond to this objection In the first section I explain what the overdemandingness objection is and argue that it applies to the Mahāyāna Buddhist monk Śāntideva In the following section I sketch possible strategies that may be employed in responding to the objection and suggest which kind of response a Buddhist like Śāntideva would make The concluding section reconstructs one such response that depends on recognizing the psychological transformation that early Buddhists and Mahāyāna practitioners alike undergo as a result of practicing the Buddhist path I also argue that the demandlessening strategy employed in Mahāyāna Buddhist texts is plausible but that it depends on Buddhist presuppositions about the psychological effects of realizing selflessness and the pervasion of ordinary experience by suffering duḥkha to have the level of effect Buddhist authors requireThe overdemandingness objection arises when a moral theory makes unfair demands on its adherents The most influential version of the problem occurs when a theory asks the agent to make an unfair sacrifice of her wellbeing Although there are other ways of formulating the problem it is only this central version that I will be concerned with4 The overdemandingness problem is most commonly associated with act consequentialism since an act consequentialist will sacrifice her wellbeing whenever doing so would maximize welfare overall Ethical theories other than consequentialism however can also face the overdemandingness objection such as a virtue ethics or deontology that endorses potentially demanding habitual dispositions or rules5 Since it can apply to versions of most moral theories we need not consider what kind of moral theory Buddhism represents before considering its vulnerability to the overdemandingness objectionEarly Indian Buddhism accepts two end goals of spiritual practice becoming an arhat who eliminates ignorance and craving and upon death is not reborn or becoming a full Buddha by adopting the path of the bodhisattva who willingly delays final nirvāṇa and takes practically limitless additional rebirths for the benefit of sentient beings6 The life of a monastic seeking arhatship seems demanding by nonBuddhist standards monks and nuns forgo family life and accept the rules of monastic discipline vinaya which include not eating after noon not handling money and avoiding musical shows and dancing Early Buddhism does not face the overdemandingness problem as I have defined it however since undertaking these apparent hardships help the monk or nun attain nirvāṇa and be released from suffering7 Therefore according to Buddhists the apparent demandingness of the practice actually increases the wellbeing of the individualIn contrast to aiming at arhatship becoming a bodhisattva is demanding in the sense I am interested in since the aspiring bodhisattva delays nirvāṇa and the release from suffering it represents8 Further they perform many demanding acts including giving up their limbs or even their lives to benefit others and being reborn in hell realms to work for the beings there Although the bodhisattva ideal gains greater prominence with the development of Mahāyāna Buddhism most Mahāyāna authors also claim that arhatship is an acceptable if inferior endpoint of spiritual practice9 In contrast to early Buddhist texts which view the bodhisattva ideal of attaining full Buddhahood as beyond the ability of most persons these Mahāyāna authors emphasize the possibility and desirability of all persons becoming bodhisattvas and eventually Buddhas For this reason they need to produce strategies that lessen the demandingness of the bodhisattva path so that it is accessible to ordinary persons Nevertheless since undertaking the bodhisattva way is optional they also do not face the overdemandingness objectionI should eliminate the suffering of others because it is suffering just like my own suffering I should take care of others because they are sentient beings just as I am a sentient being BCA 894 When happiness is equally dear to others and myself then what is so special about me that I strive after happiness for myself alone BCA 895 When fear and suffering are equally abhorrent to others and myself then what is so special about me that I protect myself but not others BCA 89610The argument appeals to the intrinsic unpleasantness of suffering as a reason to remove it no matter within whom it occurs Śāntideva suggests that there is nothing about my own suffering or happiness that justifies giving it any special priority The implied conclusion is that I should accept impartial benevolence and commit to removing everyone’s suffering without giving special concern to my own For a Buddhist like Śāntideva this would mean committing to the bodhisattva path since it is by perfecting the virtues of Buddhahood that we would become most effective in removing suffering11

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