Authors: Shurojit Chatterji Arunava Sen
Publish Date: 2009/12/06
Volume: 46, Issue: 2, Pages: 255-282
Abstract
In this paper we consider the standard voting model with a finite set of alternatives A and n voters and address the following question what are the characteristics of domains mathcal D that induce the property that every strategyproof social choice function f mathcal Dn rightarrow A satisfying unanimity has the topsonly property We first impose a minimal richness condition which ensures that for every alternative a there exists an admissible ordering where a is maximal We identify conditions on mathcal D that are sufficient for strategyproofness and unanimity to imply tops onlyness in the general case of n voters and in the special case n = 2 We provide an algorithm for constructing topsonly domains from connected graphs with elements of A as nodes We provide several applications of our results Finally we relax the minimal richness assumption and partially extend our results
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