Authors: Todd R Kaplan Shmuel Zamir
Publish Date: 2010/09/19
Volume: 50, Issue: 2, Pages: 269-302
Abstract
In 1961 Vickrey posed the problem of finding an analytic solution to a firstprice auction with two buyers having valuations uniformly distributed on underlinev 1 overlinev 1 and underlinev 2 overlinev 2 To date only special cases of the problem have been solved In this paper we solve this general problem and in addition allow for the possibility of a binding minimum bid Several interesting examples are presented including a class where the two bid functions are linearWe wish to thank seminar participants at the 18th International Conference of Game Theory at Stony Brook Games 2008 Center for the Study of Rationality Harvard University MIT Universities of Aberdeen Paris and Tokyo comments by Minoru Kitahara Bernard Lebrun Dan Sasaki Joe Swierzbinski and two anonymous referees and editing by Michael Borns Both Todd Kaplan and Shmuel Zamir would like to thank the joint support of CNRS and the British Academy Todd Kaplan wishes to thank the generous support of the Leverhulme Foundation
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