Paper Search Console

Home Search Page About Contact

Journal Title

Title of Journal: Econ Theory

Search In Journal Title:

Abbravation: Economic Theory

Search In Journal Abbravation:

Publisher

Springer Berlin Heidelberg

Search In Publisher:

DOI

10.1007/bf01864091

Search In DOI:

ISSN

1432-0479

Search In ISSN:
Search In Title Of Papers:

The effects of credit subsidies on development

Authors: António Antunes Tiago Cavalcanti Anne Villamil
Publish Date: 2014/04/09
Volume: 58, Issue: 1, Pages: 1-30
PDF Link

Abstract

Under credit market imperfections the marginal product of capital may not be equalized resulting in misallocation and lower output Preferential interest rate policies are often used to remedy the problem This paper constructs a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents imperfect enforcement and costly intermediation Occupational choice and firm size are determined endogenously by an agent’s type ability and net wealth and credit market frictions The credit program subsidizes the interest rate on loans and requires a fixed application cost which might be null We find that the credit subsidy policy has no significant effect on output but it may have negative effects on wages The program is largely a transfer from households to a small group of entrepreneurs with minor aggregate effects We also provide estimates of the effects of reducing the frictions directly When comparing differences in US output per capita in a baseline case to simulations with counterfactually high frictions intermediation costs and enforcement explain about 20–25  of the output gap We include a transition analysisWe thank Breno Albuquerque Francesco Caselli Mário Centeno Fernando de Holanda Barbosa Filho Giammario Impullitti Marcelo Mello Marcelo dos Santos André Silva Arilton Teixeira and Pedro Teles for helpful comments and suggestions We have also benefited from comments by audiences at the EPGE/CAEN Meeting Lisbon Meeting on Institutions and Political Economy LuBraMacro meeting REAP Meeting Rice University SAET Meeting INSPERSP PIMES/UFPE PUCRJ ThemaCergy University of Cambridge University of Illinois and the Workshop on Advances in Economic Growth at University of St Andrews We thank for financial support INOVA and Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia grant PTDC/EGEECO/108858/2008 and Keynes Fund from the University of Cambridge


Keywords:

References


.
Search In Abstract Of Papers:
Other Papers In This Journal:

  1. (Non-)existence and Scope of Nash Networks
  2. Weighted approval voting
  3. A note on values for Markovian coalition processes
  4. Fixed-prize tournaments versus first-price auctions in innovation contests
  5. The optimal harvesting problem with a land market: a characterization of the asymptotic convergence
  6. Term structure and forward guidance as instruments of monetary policy
  7. Paths of efficient self-enforcing trade agreements
  8. Tops-only domains
  9. Competitive screening in insurance markets with endogenous wealth heterogeneity
  10. Codes of Best Practice in competitive markets for managers
  11. Exact relations between Luenberger productivity indicators and Malmquist productivity indexes
  12. Carbon leakages: a general equilibrium view
  13. On the (non-)lattice structure of the equilibrium set in games with strategic substitutes
  14. Trade liberalization and aftermarket services for imports
  15. Passive learning: a critique by example
  16. Sequential two-prize contests
  17. Equivalence between graph-based and sequence-based extensive form games
  18. Ordinal dominance and risk aversion
  19. Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: analytic solutions to the general case
  20. Using oriented volume to prove Sperner’s lemma
  21. Using oriented volume to prove Sperner’s lemma
  22. Taxes versus quantities for a stock pollutant with endogenous abatement costs and asymmetric information
  23. Capital growth in a global warming model: will China and India sign a climate treaty?
  24. Noncooperative games, coupling constraints, and partial efficiency
  25. Equilibrium dynamics in discrete-time endogenous growth models with social constant returns
  26. Egalitarian division under Leontief Preferences
  27. Probabilistic social preference: how Machina’s Mom randomizes her choice

Search Result: