Authors: Larry Karp Jiangfeng Zhang
Publish Date: 2010/09/01
Volume: 49, Issue: 2, Pages: 371-409
Abstract
We compare emissions taxes and quotas when a strategic regulator and nonstrategic firms have asymmetric information about abatement costs and all agents use Markov perfect decision rules Firms make investment decisions that affect their future abatement costs For general functional forms firms’ investment policy is informationconstrained efficient when the regulator uses a quota but not when the regulator uses an emissions tax This advantage of quotas over emissions taxes has not previously been recognized For a special functional form linear–quadratic both policies are constrained efficient Using numerical methods we find that a tax has some advantages in this caseThis article is published under an open access license Please check the Copyright Information section for details of this license and what reuse is permitted If your intended use exceeds what is permitted by the license or if you are unable to locate the licence and reuse information please contact the Rights and Permissions team
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