Skepticism The Hard Problem for Indirect Sensitiv

Authors: Guido Melchior

Publish Date: 2013/02/08

Volume: 79, Issue: 1, Pages: 45-54

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Abstract

Keith DeRose’s solution to the skeptical problem is based on his indirect sensitivity account Sensitivity is not a necessary condition for any kind of knowledge as direct sensitivity accounts claim but the insensitivity of our beliefs that the skeptical hypotheses are false explains why we tend to judge that we do not know them The orthodox objection line against any kind of sensitivity account of knowledge is to present instances of insensitive beliefs that we still judge to constitute knowledge This objection line offers counterexamples against the claim of direct sensitivity accounts that sensitivity is necessary for any kind of knowledge These examples raise an easy problem for indirect sensitivity accounts that claim that there is only a tendency to judge that insensitive beliefs do not constitute knowledge which still applies to our beliefs that the skeptical hypotheses are false However a careful analysis reveals that some of our beliefs that the skeptical hypotheses are false are sensitive nevertheless we still judge that we do not know them Therefore the fact that some of our beliefs that the skeptical hypotheses are false are insensitive cannot explain why we tend to judge that we do not know them Hence indirect sensitivity accounts cannot fulfill their purpose of explaining our intuitions about skepticism This is the hard problem for indirect sensitivity accountsThe research was funded by the Austrian Science Fund FWF J 3174G15 I am indebted to Ernest Sosa and the members of his epistemology group at Rutgers University for their helpful comments to Martina Fürst Lisa Miracchi and Danilo Šuster for their remarks on earlier drafts of this paper and to Peter Klein for insightful and encouraging discussions

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