E=K and The Gettier Problem A Reply to Comesaña a

Authors: Rodrigo Borges

Publish Date: 2016/12/16

Volume: 82, Issue: 5, Pages: 1031-1041

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Abstract

A direct implication of E=K seems to be that false beliefs cannot justify other beliefs for no false belief can be part of one’s total evidence and one’s total evidence is what inferentially justifies belief The problem with this alleged implication of E=K as Comesaña and Kantin Philos Phenomenol Res 802447–454 2010 have noted is that it contradicts a claim Gettier cases rely on The original Gettier cases relied on two principles that justification is closed under known entailment and that sometimes one is justified in believing a falsehood In this paper I argue that E=K contrary to what Comesaña and Kantin would want us to believe is compatible with the agent being justified in believing a falsehoodThanks to Claudio de Almeida Juan Comesaña Duncan Pritchard and Ernest Sosa for their generous feedback on earlier versions of this paper Thanks also to two referees for Erkenntnis for their helpful suggestions Very special thanks to Peter Klein who read way too many drafts of this paper I hope the end product does some justice to Peters infinite support and helpfulness The research in this paper was partially funded by the CAPES/Fulbright commission through a doctoral fellowship and by FAPESP through a postdoctoral research fellowship I am very grateful for their support

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