Fischer’s Deterministic FrankfurtStyle Argument

Authors: Yishai Cohen

Publish Date: 2016/04/09

Volume: 82, Issue: 1, Pages: 121-140

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Abstract

According to the Dilemma Defense it is questionbegging against the incompatibilist defender of the principle of alternative possibilities PAP to assume that the agent in a deterministic Frankfurtstyle case FSC cannot do otherwise in light of causal determinism but is nevertheless morally responsible As a result Fischer Philos Rev 119315–336 2010 Analysis 73489–496 2013 attempts to undermine PAP in a different manner via a deterministic FSC More specifically Fischer attempts to show that if causal determinism rules out an agent’s moral responsibility it is not in virtue of its eliminating the agent’s alternative possibilities I contend that once we focus upon the distinction between entailment and explanation the incompatibilist defender of PAP can successfully rebut Fischer’s argument I argue for this claim while granting Fischer a number of assumptions that only render a defense of PAP more difficult Additionally I cast doubt upon Palmer’s Synthese 1913847–3864 2014 critique of Fischer’s argument which in turn renders my defense of PAP all the more criticalModified promise breaker Suppose that Jones finds himself with an irresistible desire to decide to break his promise…and Jones is a moral person So upon finding himself with this desire Jones tries his very best to resist it However despite trying his very best to resist the desire he eventually succumbs to it and decides to break his promise Palmer 2014 3857Now once we focus on IPW which explicitly concerns basic mental actions it is initially puzzling as to how Modifiedpromisebreaker is supposed to falsify IPW After all Modifiedpromisebreaker involves Jones’ doing something viz trying to resist his desire before Jones decides to break his promise which ex hypothesi is not something Jones does in virtue of doing anything else So how could Jones’ trying to resist his desire be relevant to whether or not Jones is nonderivatively morally responsible for his decision to break his promiseModified promise breaker Although it is up to Jones whether to refrain from deciding to break his promise from t1–t4 if Jones does not decide to break his promise at t4 or any earlier time Jones will be causally determined by factors beyond his control to decide to break his promise at t5 Now it so happens that from t1–t4 Jones tries to resist his desire by refraining from deciding to break his promise from t1–t4 As a result at t5 Jones decides to break his promise and Jones’ decision is causally determined by factors beyond his controlFirst question Is Jones’ refraining from deciding to break his promise from t1–t4 irrelevant to the causal explanation of Jones’ decision to break his promise at t5 No This fact is relevant For the fact that Jones refrained from deciding to break his promise from t1–t4 explains why at t5 rather than some earlier time Jones decided to break his promiseSecond question Is Jones’ refraining from deciding to break his promise from t1–t4 irrelevant to the causal explanation of Jones’ decision to break his promise simpliciter Yes For Jones’ refraining from deciding to break his promise from t1–t4 makes no difference to whether Jones decides to break his promise simpliciterNow if Jones’ refraining from deciding to break his promise from t1–t4 is relevant to whether or not Jones is nonderivatively morally responsible for deciding to break his promise simpliciter then IPW is false However by the lights of the incompatibilist defender of PAP this is not relevant to whether Jones is nonderivatively morally responsible for deciding to break his promise simpliciter After all it is not up to Jones whether to decide to break his promise simpliciter So by the lights of the incompatibilist defender of PAP—whom Palmer is defending—no matter at which time Jones decides to break his promise Jones is not nonderivatively morally responsible for deciding to break his promise simpliciter in ModifiedpromisebreakerTo be clear the incompatibilist defender of PAP can still maintain that if Jones were to have instead decided at t4 to break his promise then Jones would have been nonderivatively morally responsible for deciding at t4 to break his promise Indeed along with Ginet 1996 and Franklin 2011b Palmer 2011 2013 himself defends this position19 However this position is consistent with IPW20To conclude I offered a reason to doubt that Modifiedpromisebreaker undermines IPW Moreover I have tried to flesh out the details of Modifiedpromisebreaker in order to further strengthen such doubt Hence unless we are given some new reason to reject IPW the incompatibilist defender of PAP has good reason to accept IPW since it is prima facie plausible So it appears that Fischer’s Improved Argument can successfully resist Palmer’s objection

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