Authors: Simon M Huttegger Brian Skyrms Rory Smead Kevin J S Zollman
Publish Date: 2009/02/26
Volume: 172, Issue: 1, Pages: 177-
Abstract
Transfer of information between senders and receivers of one kind or another is essential to all life David Lewis introduced a game theoretic model of the simplest case where one sender and one receiver have pure common interest How hard or easy is it for evolution to achieve information transfer in Lewis signaling The answers involve surprising subtleties We discuss some if these in terms of evolutionary dynamics in both finite and infinite populations with and without mutationThis article is published under an open access license Please check the Copyright Information section for details of this license and what reuse is permitted If your intended use exceeds what is permitted by the license or if you are unable to locate the licence and reuse information please contact the Rights and Permissions team
Keywords: