Journal Title
Title of Journal: Synthese
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Publisher
Springer Netherlands
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Authors: Zachary Horne Jonathan Livengood
Publish Date: 2015/12/17
Volume: 194, Issue: 4, Pages: 1189-1218
Abstract
One widelyendorsed argument in the experimental philosophy literature maintains that intuitive judgments are unreliable because they are influenced by the order in which thought experiments prompting those judgments are presented Here we explicitly state this argument from ordering effects and show that any plausible understanding of the argument leads to an untenable conclusion First we show that the normative principle is ambiguous On one reading of the principle the empirical observation is wellsupported but the normative principle is false On the other reading the empirical observation has only weak support and the normative principle if correct would impugn the reliability of deliberative reasoning testimony memory and perception since judgments in all these areas are sensitive to ordering in the relevant sense We then reflect on what goes wrong with the argumentThanks to Josh Alexander Wes Buckwalter Greg Gandenberger Balazs Gyenis John Hummel Josh Knobe Dan Korman Conor MayoWilson Derek Powell David Rose Jonah Schupbach Eric Schwitzgebel John Turri Jonathan Waskan Dan Malinsky Shaun Nichols and two anonymous referees for comments on earlier drafts
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