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Title of Journal: Synthese

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Abbravation: Synthese

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Springer Netherlands

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10.1016/0038-1101(68)90054-3

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1573-0964

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Parsing the rainbow

Authors: Pendaran Roberts
Publish Date: 2013/11/17
Volume: 191, Issue: 8, Pages: 1793-1811
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Abstract

Navigating the ontology of color used to be a simple affair There was the naive view that colors really are in objects the way they appear and the view that they are secondary qualities to cause certain experiences in us Today there are myriad welldeveloped views but no satisfactory taxonomy of philosophical theories on color In this article I first examine the two newest taxonomies on offer and argue that they are inadequate In particular I look at Brogaard’s taxonomy and then Cohen’s One of the reasons I am displeased with Brogaard and Cohen’s taxonomies is that I find it implausible that dispositions are relational properties I provide an argument against this way of classifying dispositions Having learned from the vices and virtues of Brogaard and Cohens’ taxonomies I provide what I believe is a muchenhanced way of taxonomizing philosophical views on color My taxonomy rules out certain views clarifies others and shows that there is an unnoticed view worthy of considerationI am especially grateful to Philip Percival for helping me to think through the contents of this paper I am also thankful to Stephen Barker and Benjamin Smart Their 2012 article inspired some of what I say in Sect 3 In addition I am thankful to Harold Noonan and Jonathan Tallant for their helpful advice Last but not least I would like to thank two anonymous referees for their insightful comments

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  2. Physicalism and strict implication
  3. Adequate formalization
  4. Desires, beliefs and conditional desirability
  5. Inscrutability and visual objects
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  10. Epistemic and Dialectical Models of Begging the Question
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