Against a descriptive vindication of doxastic volu

Authors: Nikolaj Nottelmann

Publish Date: 2015/05/26

Volume: 194, Issue: 8, Pages: 2721-2744

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Abstract

In this paper I examine whether doxastic voluntarism should be taken seriously within normative doxastic ethics First I show that currently the psychological evidence does not positively support doxastic voluntarism even if I accept recent conclusions by Matthias Steup that the relevant evidence does not decisively undermine voluntarism either Thus it would seem that normative doxastic ethics could not justifiedly appeal directly to voluntarist assumptions Second I attempt to bring out how doxastic voluntarists may nevertheless hope to stir methodological worries within normative doxastic ethics should they demonstrate that our typical practices of deontically evaluating doxastic states crucially rely on voluntarist assumptions I also argue that some of the key arguments thought positively to support voluntarism as a psychological thesis may be put to better effect in the context of this kind of descriptive vindication However a closer examination reveals that nothing obviously suggests that voluntarism provides a better regimentation of our ascription practices as compared to rival theses concerning human powers of doxastic controlWork on this article was supported by the Danish Council for Independent Research—Humanities Anthony Booth Søren Harnow Klausen Miriam McCormick Rik Peels Matthias Steup and two anonymous referees for this journal each offered indispensable comments and advice on previous versions of this article I also wish to thank the audience at the conference Doxastic Agency Epistemic Responsibility at RuhrUniversity Bochum 24 June 2014 Special thanks extend to Heinrich Wansing and Andrea Kruse organizers of that conference and editors of the present special issue

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