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Title of Journal: Synthese

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Abbravation: Synthese

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Springer Netherlands

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DOI

10.1016/j.annder.2010.02.010

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1573-0964

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“If you’d wiggled A then B would’ve changed”

Authors: Katrin Schulz
Publish Date: 2010/09/14
Volume: 179, Issue: 2, Pages: 239-251
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Abstract

This paper deals with the truth conditions of conditional sentences It focuses on a particular class of problematic examples for semantic theories for these sentences I will argue that the examples show the need to refer to dynamic in particular causal laws in an approach to their truth conditions More particularly I will claim that we need a causal notion of consequence The proposal subsequently made uses a representation of causal dependencies as proposed in Pearl 2000 to formalize a causal notion of consequence This notion inserted in premise semantics for counterfactuals in the style of Veltman 1976 and Kratzer 1979 will provide a new interpretation rule for conditionals I will illustrate how this approach overcomes problems of previous proposals and end with some remarks on remaining questionsThis article is published under an open access license Please check the Copyright Information section for details of this license and what reuse is permitted If your intended use exceeds what is permitted by the license or if you are unable to locate the licence and reuse information please contact the Rights and Permissions team


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Other Papers In This Journal:

  1. Foiling the Black Knight
  2. Physicalism and strict implication
  3. Adequate formalization
  4. Desires, beliefs and conditional desirability
  5. Inscrutability and visual objects
  6. Margin for error semantics and signal perception
  7. Sleeping Beauty and Self-location: A Hybrid Model
  8. Phylogenetic inference to the best explanation and the bad lot argument
  9. Against a descriptive vindication of doxastic voluntarism
  10. Epistemic and Dialectical Models of Begging the Question
  11. Parsing the rainbow
  12. Why neuroscience matters to cognitive neuropsychology
  13. Why neuroscience matters to cognitive neuropsychology
  14. Existence problems in philosophy and science
  15. Logic and social interaction: introduction
  16. Similarity and cotenability
  17. Towards a reflexive framework for development: technology transfer after the empirical turn
  18. A triviality result for the “Desire by Necessity” thesis
  19. The ontology of social groups
  20. Which empathy? Limitations in the mirrored “understanding” of emotion
  21. Recognition-primed group decisions via judgement aggregation
  22. A discrete solution for the paradox of Achilles and the tortoise
  23. A foundation for presentism
  24. Externalism and “knowing what” one thinks
  25. Comparative syllogism and counterfactual knowledge
  26. Semantics, conceptual spaces, and the meeting of minds
  27. Inference to the best explanation and mathematical realism
  28. Why follow the royal rule?
  29. Ordering effects, updating effects, and the specter of global skepticism
  30. Evolutionary dynamics of Lewis signaling games: signaling systems vs. partial pooling
  31. Can the new indispensability argument be saved from Euclidean rescues?
  32. Starting from the scenario Euclid–Bolyai–Einstein
  33. Reversing 30 years of discussion: why causal decision theorists should one-box
  34. On denying presuppositions
  35. Remarks on counterpossibles
  36. Knowledge and the norm of assertion: a simple test
  37. Information, possible worlds and the cooptation of scepticism
  38. Levels of communication and lexical semantics
  39. Many entities, no identity
  40. Why Euclid’s geometry brooked no doubt: J. H. Lambert on certainty and the existence of models

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