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Title of Journal: Philos Stud

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Abbravation: Philosophical Studies

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Kluwer Academic Publishers

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10.1007/bf01326617

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1573-0883

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Hume’s Solution of the Goodman Paradox and the Rel

Authors: Nathan Stemmer
Publish Date: 2006/09/21
Volume: 132, Issue: 2, Pages: 137-159
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Abstract

Many solutions of the Goodman paradox have been proposed but so far no agreement has been reached about which is the correct solution However I will not contribute here to the discussion with a new solution Rather I will argue that a solution has been in front of us for more than two hundred years because a careful reading of Hume’s account of inductive inferences shows that contrary to Goodman’s opinion it embodies a correct solution of the paradox Moreover the account even includes a correct answer to Mill’s question of why in some cases a single instance is sufficient for a complete induction since Hume gives a wellsupported explanation of this reliability phenomenon The discussion also suggests that Bayesian theory by itself cannot explain this phenomenon Finally we will see that Hume’s explanation of the reliability phenomenon is surprisingly similar to the explanation given lately by a number of naturalistic philosophers in their discussion of the Goodman paradox

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Other Papers In This Journal:
  1. Meaning in the lives of humans and other animals
  2. Acquaintance, singular thought and propositional constituency
  3. The paradox of the question
  4. Randomized controlled trials and the flow of information: comment on Cartwright
  5. Précis of Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading
  6. The non-transitivity of the contingent and occasional identity relations
  7. Two arguments against the punishment-forbearance account of forgiveness
  8. Value and the regulation of the sentiments
  9. God’s silence
  10. Norms of intentionality: norms that don’t guide
  11. How fallacious is the consequence fallacy?
  12. How fallacious is the consequence fallacy?
  13. Rationally self-ascribed anti-expertise
  14. Internalism about reasons: sad but true?
  15. Comments on Sydney Shoemaker’s Physical Realization
  16. Free will and the construction of options
  17. Absence of action
  18. The cognitivist account of meaning and the liar paradox
  19. A challenge for Frankfurt-style compatibilists
  20. Moral worth and rationality as acting on good reasons
  21. Asymmetric population axiology: deliberative neutrality delivered
  22. Pictures, perspective and possibility
  23. The real symmetry problem(s) for wide-scope accounts of rationality
  24. Knowledge and epistemic necessity
  25. Shaftesbury’s place in the history of moral realism
  26. Infinitism, finitude and normativity
  27. Memory and identity
  28. Complicitous liability in war
  29. Fictionalism versus deflationism: a new look
  30. Universals
  31. Précis
  32. Making sense of unpleasantness: evaluationism and shooting the messenger
  33. Permissive consent: a robust reason-changing account
  34. Should the probabilities count?
  35. Extended simples
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