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Title of Journal: Philos Stud

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Abbravation: Philosophical Studies

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Springer Netherlands

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10.1016/0167-5087(82)90631-7

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1573-0883

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A challenge for Frankfurtstyle compatibilists

Authors: Philip Swenson
Publish Date: 2014/07/01
Volume: 172, Issue: 5, Pages: 1279-1285
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Abstract

The principle of alternative possibilities PAP tells us that an agent is morally responsible for an action only if he could have done otherwise Frankfurtstyle cases FSCs provide an extremely influential challenge to the PAP Frankfurt J Philos 66829–839 1969 And Frankfurtstyle compatibilists are motivated to accept compatibilism about responsibility and determinism in part due to FSCs But there is a significant tension between our judgments about responsibility in FSCs and our judgments about responsibility in certain omissions cases This tension has thus far largely been treated as an internal puzzle for defenders of FSCs to solve My goal here is to regiment this tension into a clear argument which if sound undermines the FSC based critique of PAP I will also argue that there is an in principle reason to doubt that FrankfurtStyle Compatibilists will be able to successfully respond to my argumentFor helpful comments on this paper thanks to Randolph Clarke D Justin Coates Chris Franklin Joshua Hollowell Ben MitchellYellin Garrett Pendergraft John Perry Michael Nelson Adam R Thompson and Patrick Todd Thanks also to the UCR Agency Writing Workshop and to audiences at the Central APA and the Tennessee Value and Agency Workshop And extraspecial thanks are due to John Martin Fischer for his significant help and encouragement

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  1. Meaning in the lives of humans and other animals
  2. Acquaintance, singular thought and propositional constituency
  3. The paradox of the question
  4. Randomized controlled trials and the flow of information: comment on Cartwright
  5. Précis of Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading
  6. The non-transitivity of the contingent and occasional identity relations
  7. Two arguments against the punishment-forbearance account of forgiveness
  8. Value and the regulation of the sentiments
  9. God’s silence
  10. Norms of intentionality: norms that don’t guide
  11. How fallacious is the consequence fallacy?
  12. How fallacious is the consequence fallacy?
  13. Rationally self-ascribed anti-expertise
  14. Internalism about reasons: sad but true?
  15. Comments on Sydney Shoemaker’s Physical Realization
  16. Free will and the construction of options
  17. Absence of action
  18. The cognitivist account of meaning and the liar paradox
  19. Moral worth and rationality as acting on good reasons
  20. Asymmetric population axiology: deliberative neutrality delivered
  21. Pictures, perspective and possibility
  22. The real symmetry problem(s) for wide-scope accounts of rationality
  23. Knowledge and epistemic necessity
  24. Shaftesbury’s place in the history of moral realism
  25. Infinitism, finitude and normativity
  26. Memory and identity
  27. Complicitous liability in war
  28. Fictionalism versus deflationism: a new look
  29. Hume’s Solution of the Goodman Paradox and the Reliability Riddle (Mill’s problem)
  30. Universals
  31. Précis
  32. Making sense of unpleasantness: evaluationism and shooting the messenger
  33. Permissive consent: a robust reason-changing account
  34. Should the probabilities count?
  35. Extended simples
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