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Title of Journal: Philos Stud

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Abbravation: Philosophical Studies

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Springer Netherlands

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10.1007/bf00939668

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1573-0883

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Rationally selfascribed antiexpertise

Authors: Nicolas Bommarito
Publish Date: 2009/10/13
Volume: 151, Issue: 3, Pages: 413-419
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Abstract

In their paper “I Can’t Believe I’m Stupid” Adam Elga and Andy Egan introduce a notion of antiexpertise and argue that it is never rational to believe oneself to be an antiexpert I wish to deny the claim that it is never rational for agents like us to ascribe antiexpertise to ourselves by describing cases where selfascribed antiexpertise makes real life agents more rational

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Other Papers In This Journal:
  1. Meaning in the lives of humans and other animals
  2. Acquaintance, singular thought and propositional constituency
  3. The paradox of the question
  4. Randomized controlled trials and the flow of information: comment on Cartwright
  5. Précis of Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading
  6. The non-transitivity of the contingent and occasional identity relations
  7. Two arguments against the punishment-forbearance account of forgiveness
  8. Value and the regulation of the sentiments
  9. God’s silence
  10. Norms of intentionality: norms that don’t guide
  11. How fallacious is the consequence fallacy?
  12. How fallacious is the consequence fallacy?
  13. Internalism about reasons: sad but true?
  14. Comments on Sydney Shoemaker’s Physical Realization
  15. Free will and the construction of options
  16. Absence of action
  17. The cognitivist account of meaning and the liar paradox
  18. A challenge for Frankfurt-style compatibilists
  19. Moral worth and rationality as acting on good reasons
  20. Asymmetric population axiology: deliberative neutrality delivered
  21. Pictures, perspective and possibility
  22. The real symmetry problem(s) for wide-scope accounts of rationality
  23. Knowledge and epistemic necessity
  24. Shaftesbury’s place in the history of moral realism
  25. Infinitism, finitude and normativity
  26. Memory and identity
  27. Complicitous liability in war
  28. Fictionalism versus deflationism: a new look
  29. Hume’s Solution of the Goodman Paradox and the Reliability Riddle (Mill’s problem)
  30. Universals
  31. Précis
  32. Making sense of unpleasantness: evaluationism and shooting the messenger
  33. Permissive consent: a robust reason-changing account
  34. Should the probabilities count?
  35. Extended simples
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