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Title of Journal: Philos Stud

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Abbravation: Philosophical Studies

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Springer Netherlands

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10.1016/0003-3472(69)90022-0

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1573-0883

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The real symmetry problems for widescope accoun

Authors: Errol Lord
Publish Date: 2013/11/29
Volume: 170, Issue: 3, Pages: 443-464
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Abstract

You are irrational when you are akratic On this point most agree Despite this agreement there is a tremendous amount of disagreement about what the correct explanation of this data is Narrowscopers think that the correct explanation is that you are violating a narrowscope conditional requirement You lack an intention to x that you are required to have given the fact that you believe you ought to x Widescopers disagree They think that a conditional you are required to make true is false You aren’t required to have any particular attitudes You’re just required to intend to x or not believe you ought to x Widescope accounts are symmetrical insofar as they predict that you are complying with the relevant requirement just so long as the relevant conditional is true Some narrowscopers object to this symmetry However there is disagreement about why the symmetry is objectionable This has led widescopers to defend their view against a number of different symmetry objections I think their defenses in the face of these objections are on the whole plausible Unfortunately for them they aren’t defending their view against the best version of the objection In this paper I will show that there is a symmetry objection to widescope accounts that both hasn’t been responded to and is a serious problem for widescope accounts Moreover my version of the objection will allow us to see that there is at least one narrowscope view that has been seriously underappreciated in the literatureThanks to John Brunero Gideon Rosen Sarah McGrath Delia Graff Fara Gil Harman Alida Liberman Shyam Nair Mark Schroeder Michael Smith Daniel Fogal Kurt Sylvan Jack Woods Sam Shpall and Richard Yetter Chappell for comments and discussion Ancestors of this paper were presented at SLACRR the Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress and the NIP/IP Graduate Conference in Aberdeen Thanks to those audiences especially Justin Snedegar for providing formal comments at RoME and Jonathan Way for providing formal comments at the other two My largest debt is to Jonathan for many sets of excellent written comments and numerous conversations

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