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Title of Journal: Philos Stud

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Abbravation: Philosophical Studies

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Springer Netherlands

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10.1002/ana.24130

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1573-0883

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Norms of intentionality norms that don’t guide

Authors: Benjamin W Jarvis
Publish Date: 2010/09/01
Volume: 157, Issue: 1, Pages: 1-25
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Abstract

More than ever it is in vogue to argue that no norms either play a role in or directly follow from the theory of mental content In this paper I present an intuitive theory of intentionality including a theory of mental content on which norms are constitutive of the intentional properties of attitude and content in order to show that this trend is misguided Although this theory of intentionality—the teleological theory of intentional representation—does involve a commitment to representational norms these norms are not problematic in the way critics have suggested they would be In particular these norms do not guide thinking by motivating intentional agents to intentionally accord with them as a result no obvious vicious regress threatens the theory In the final section of this paper I argue that accepting this teleological theory of intentionality need not commit one to thinking that intentionality is the product of natural selectionI would particularly like to thank Richard Heck Christopher Hill Joshua Schechter Jamie Dreier Jonathan Ichikawa Michael Young and Katherine Rubin for their comments and discussion on this or other closely related projects This paper was presented at a research seminar jointly hosted by Arché Research Centre The University of St Andrews and Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature The University of Oslo I offer my gratitude to the participants of that seminar

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Other Papers In This Journal:
  1. Meaning in the lives of humans and other animals
  2. Acquaintance, singular thought and propositional constituency
  3. The paradox of the question
  4. Randomized controlled trials and the flow of information: comment on Cartwright
  5. Précis of Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading
  6. The non-transitivity of the contingent and occasional identity relations
  7. Two arguments against the punishment-forbearance account of forgiveness
  8. Value and the regulation of the sentiments
  9. God’s silence
  10. How fallacious is the consequence fallacy?
  11. How fallacious is the consequence fallacy?
  12. Rationally self-ascribed anti-expertise
  13. Internalism about reasons: sad but true?
  14. Comments on Sydney Shoemaker’s Physical Realization
  15. Free will and the construction of options
  16. Absence of action
  17. The cognitivist account of meaning and the liar paradox
  18. A challenge for Frankfurt-style compatibilists
  19. Moral worth and rationality as acting on good reasons
  20. Asymmetric population axiology: deliberative neutrality delivered
  21. Pictures, perspective and possibility
  22. The real symmetry problem(s) for wide-scope accounts of rationality
  23. Knowledge and epistemic necessity
  24. Shaftesbury’s place in the history of moral realism
  25. Infinitism, finitude and normativity
  26. Memory and identity
  27. Complicitous liability in war
  28. Fictionalism versus deflationism: a new look
  29. Hume’s Solution of the Goodman Paradox and the Reliability Riddle (Mill’s problem)
  30. Universals
  31. Précis
  32. Making sense of unpleasantness: evaluationism and shooting the messenger
  33. Permissive consent: a robust reason-changing account
  34. Should the probabilities count?
  35. Extended simples
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