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Title of Journal: Philos Stud

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Abbravation: Philosophical Studies

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Springer Netherlands

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10.1002/cnm.1630010201

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1573-0883

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Should the probabilities count

Authors: Katharina Berndt Rasmussen
Publish Date: 2011/01/14
Volume: 159, Issue: 2, Pages: 205-218
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Abstract

When facing a choice between saving one person and saving many some people have argued that fairness requires us to decide without aggregating numbers rather we should decide by coin toss or some form of lottery or alternatively we should straightforwardly save the greater number but justify this in a nonaggregating contractualist way This paper expands the debate beyond wellknown number cases to previously underconsidered probability cases in which not only the numbers of people but also the probabilities of success for saving people vary It is shown that in these latter cases both the coin toss and the lottery lead to what is called an awkward conclusion which makes probabilities count in a problematic way Attempts to avoid this conclusion are shown to lead into difficulties as well Finally it is shown that while the greater number method cannot be justified on contractualist grounds for probability cases it may be replaced by another decision method which is so justified This decision method is extensionally equivalent to maximising expected value and seems to be the least problematic way of dealing with probability cases in a nonaggregating mannerThanks to Emil Andersson Gustaf Arrhenius John Broome Iwao Hirose Frej Klem Thomsen Kasper LippertRasmussen Jonas Olson Niklas OlssonYaouzis Ben Saunders Julian Savulescu Folke Tersman Gerard Vong and two anonymous referees as well as the participants of the James Martin Advanced Research Seminar at University of Oxford the PhDseminar in practical philosophy at Stockholm University the Applied Ethics Graduate Discussion Group at the Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics University of Oxford and the 2009 conference of Nordic Network for Political Theory in Copenhagen for valuable comments on earlier versions of this paper The author thankfully acknowledges travel grants for the latter two meetings from the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences and the Knut and Alice Wallenberg Foundation


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  2. Acquaintance, singular thought and propositional constituency
  3. The paradox of the question
  4. Randomized controlled trials and the flow of information: comment on Cartwright
  5. Précis of Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading
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  7. Two arguments against the punishment-forbearance account of forgiveness
  8. Value and the regulation of the sentiments
  9. God’s silence
  10. Norms of intentionality: norms that don’t guide
  11. How fallacious is the consequence fallacy?
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  13. Rationally self-ascribed anti-expertise
  14. Internalism about reasons: sad but true?
  15. Comments on Sydney Shoemaker’s Physical Realization
  16. Free will and the construction of options
  17. Absence of action
  18. The cognitivist account of meaning and the liar paradox
  19. A challenge for Frankfurt-style compatibilists
  20. Moral worth and rationality as acting on good reasons
  21. Asymmetric population axiology: deliberative neutrality delivered
  22. Pictures, perspective and possibility
  23. The real symmetry problem(s) for wide-scope accounts of rationality
  24. Knowledge and epistemic necessity
  25. Shaftesbury’s place in the history of moral realism
  26. Infinitism, finitude and normativity
  27. Memory and identity
  28. Complicitous liability in war
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  31. Universals
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  33. Making sense of unpleasantness: evaluationism and shooting the messenger
  34. Permissive consent: a robust reason-changing account
  35. Extended simples

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