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Title of Journal: Philos Stud

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Abbravation: Philosophical Studies

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Springer Netherlands

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10.1007/978-0-387-09734-3

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1573-0883

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Infinitism finitude and normativity

Authors: John Turri
Publish Date: 2011/12/22
Volume: 163, Issue: 3, Pages: 791-795
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Abstract

I evaluate two new objections to an infinitist account of epistemic justification and conclude that they fail to raise any new problems for infinitism The new objections are a refined version of the finitemind objection which says infinitism demands more than finite minds can muster and the normativity objection which says infinitism entails that we are epistemically blameless in holding all our beliefs I show how resources deployed in response to the most popular objection to infinitism the original finitemind objection can be redeployed to address the two new objections

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Other Papers In This Journal:
  1. Meaning in the lives of humans and other animals
  2. Acquaintance, singular thought and propositional constituency
  3. The paradox of the question
  4. Randomized controlled trials and the flow of information: comment on Cartwright
  5. Précis of Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading
  6. The non-transitivity of the contingent and occasional identity relations
  7. Two arguments against the punishment-forbearance account of forgiveness
  8. Value and the regulation of the sentiments
  9. God’s silence
  10. Norms of intentionality: norms that don’t guide
  11. How fallacious is the consequence fallacy?
  12. How fallacious is the consequence fallacy?
  13. Rationally self-ascribed anti-expertise
  14. Internalism about reasons: sad but true?
  15. Comments on Sydney Shoemaker’s Physical Realization
  16. Free will and the construction of options
  17. Absence of action
  18. The cognitivist account of meaning and the liar paradox
  19. A challenge for Frankfurt-style compatibilists
  20. Moral worth and rationality as acting on good reasons
  21. Asymmetric population axiology: deliberative neutrality delivered
  22. Pictures, perspective and possibility
  23. The real symmetry problem(s) for wide-scope accounts of rationality
  24. Knowledge and epistemic necessity
  25. Shaftesbury’s place in the history of moral realism
  26. Memory and identity
  27. Complicitous liability in war
  28. Fictionalism versus deflationism: a new look
  29. Hume’s Solution of the Goodman Paradox and the Reliability Riddle (Mill’s problem)
  30. Universals
  31. Précis
  32. Making sense of unpleasantness: evaluationism and shooting the messenger
  33. Permissive consent: a robust reason-changing account
  34. Should the probabilities count?
  35. Extended simples
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