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Title of Journal: Philos Stud

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Abbravation: Philosophical Studies

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Springer Netherlands

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DOI

10.1016/0003-9861(86)90244-4

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1573-0883

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Making sense of unpleasantness evaluationism and

Authors: Paul Boswell
Publish Date: 2016/02/27
Volume: 173, Issue: 11, Pages: 2969-2992
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Abstract

Unpleasant sensations possess a unique ability to make certain aversive actions seem reasonable to us But what is it about these experiences that give them that ability According to some recent evaluationist accounts it is their representational content unpleasant sensations represent a certain event as bad for one Unfortunately evaluationism seems unable to make sense of our aversive behavior to the sensations themselves for it appears to entail that taking a painkiller is akin to shooting the messenger and is every bit as unreasonable In this paper I distinguish two versions of the shootingthemessenger challenge First how do we account for the badness of unpleasant sensation And second how do we account for our access to that badness I suggest plausible responses to the first question but I also argue that the seriousness of the second has not been appreciated I then propose a solution to the second when we introspect our pains we also turn our emotional distress inwards enabling them to represent our pains as badVersions of this paper were presented in Budapest and Ann Arbor and it benefited from the comments and questions of audiences in both I’d like to especially thank Peter Railton Sarah Buss Allan Gibbard James Joyce Rohan Sud Daniel Drucker and the members of the 2015 Michigan Philosophy Dissertation Working Group for all their comments and suggestions I’d also like to thank an uncommonly helpful anonymous referee by whose criticisms and suggestions the paper was greatly improved


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Other Papers In This Journal:

  1. Meaning in the lives of humans and other animals
  2. Acquaintance, singular thought and propositional constituency
  3. The paradox of the question
  4. Randomized controlled trials and the flow of information: comment on Cartwright
  5. Précis of Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading
  6. The non-transitivity of the contingent and occasional identity relations
  7. Two arguments against the punishment-forbearance account of forgiveness
  8. Value and the regulation of the sentiments
  9. God’s silence
  10. Norms of intentionality: norms that don’t guide
  11. How fallacious is the consequence fallacy?
  12. How fallacious is the consequence fallacy?
  13. Rationally self-ascribed anti-expertise
  14. Internalism about reasons: sad but true?
  15. Comments on Sydney Shoemaker’s Physical Realization
  16. Free will and the construction of options
  17. Absence of action
  18. The cognitivist account of meaning and the liar paradox
  19. A challenge for Frankfurt-style compatibilists
  20. Moral worth and rationality as acting on good reasons
  21. Asymmetric population axiology: deliberative neutrality delivered
  22. Pictures, perspective and possibility
  23. The real symmetry problem(s) for wide-scope accounts of rationality
  24. Knowledge and epistemic necessity
  25. Shaftesbury’s place in the history of moral realism
  26. Infinitism, finitude and normativity
  27. Memory and identity
  28. Complicitous liability in war
  29. Fictionalism versus deflationism: a new look
  30. Hume’s Solution of the Goodman Paradox and the Reliability Riddle (Mill’s problem)
  31. Universals
  32. Précis
  33. Permissive consent: a robust reason-changing account
  34. Should the probabilities count?
  35. Extended simples

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