Permissive consent a robust reasonchanging accou

Authors: Neil C Manson

Publish Date: 2016/04/05

Volume: 173, Issue: 12, Pages: 3317-3334

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Abstract

There is an ongoing debate about the “ontology” of consent Some argue that it is a mental act some that it is a “hybrid” of a mental act plus behaviour that signifies that act others argue that consent is a performative akin to promising or commanding Here it is argued that all these views are mistaken—though some more so than others We begin with the question whether a normatively efficacious act of consent can be completed in the mind alone Standard objections to this “mentalist” account of consent can be rebutted Here we identify a much deeper problem for mentalism Normatively transformative acts of consent change others’ reasons for acting in a distinctive—“robust”—way Robust reasonchanging involves acts aimed at fulfilling a distinctive kind of reflexive and recognitiondirected intention Such acts cannot be coherently performed in the mind alone Consent is not a mental act but nor is it the signification of such an act Acts of consent cannot be “completed” in the mind and it is a mistake to view consent behaviour as making known a completed act of consent The robust reasonchanging account of consent developed here shares something with the performative theory but is not saddled with a label whose home is philosophy of language Certain kinds of performative utterance may change reasons robustly but not all robust reasonchanging involves or requires acts of speech and consent can be effected by a wide range of behavioural acts

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